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Will the former Yugoslav Republics abuse the EU to solve their bilateral conflicts?

Feb 23rd, 2011 | By Kamiel Mesie | Tags: , , , ,

The prob­lem­atic enlarge­ment pro­cess on the West Balkans

In Decem­ber 2008, the nego­ti­ation talks on Croatia’s acces­sion to the European Union that had been well estab­lished for over three years came to a sud­den halt. Reason for this was a veto from Croatia’s neigh­bour and former fel­low in the Yugoslav social­ist repub­lic, Slov­e­nia, about a bor­der dis­pute in the Adri­atic Sea. The Slov­e­nian Gov­ern­ment did not wish to con­tinue the nego­ti­ations as long as the bor­der dis­pute was not resolved. Although a swift and smooth acces­sion of Croa­tia into the EU was strongly sup­por­ted by prac­tic­ally all EU mem­ber states, Slov­e­nia chose to use its veto power in the Coun­cil of the European Union to resolve an essen­tially bilat­eral issue, and the pro­cess of Croa­tian acces­sion lay quiet for almost a year.

Con­sid­er­ing the object­ive of the European Union to largely remove national bor­ders and cre­ate an open mar­ket, it seems some­what of a para­dox or even slightly absurd that bor­der demarc­a­tion has been made into such an issue, while the nego­ti­ations actu­ally dealt with mak­ing these bor­ders less sig­ni­fic­ant. How­ever, this example once again illus­trates the import­ance coun­tries still attach to geo-political issues, and this may even be par­tic­u­larly the case in the West Balkan region. It is well under­stood that for sev­eral hun­dreds of years the West Balkans has been a highly com­plex region, made up of many ter­rit­or­ies with sev­eral dif­fer­ent nations, cul­tures and reli­gions liv­ing in a con­fined area next to each other. After the iron grip by which Josip Tito sup­pressed all forms of nation­al­ism and the sub­sequent dis­sol­u­tion of Yugoslavia, viol­ent wars broke out among the former Yugoslav repub­lics. The dread­ful res­ult is that the west Balkan region has seen the most blood­shed in Europe since World War II, with some minor hos­til­it­ies con­tinu­ing even to this day.  

It is a very pos­it­ive devel­op­ment that the former Yugoslav repub­lics now want to come to terms with their viol­ent past and seek for a brighter future through the pro­cess of European integ­ra­tion. Almost all west Balkan coun­tries now have applied for EU mem­ber­ship, are already mem­ber or can­did­ate mem­ber or have a Sta­bil­isa­tion and Asso­ci­ation Agree­ment (SAA) with the EU. How­ever, the earlier men­tioned incid­ent of the Slov­e­nian block­ade to Croa­tian mem­ber­ship is very wor­ry­ing, since this type of prob­lems could become illus­trat­ive for fur­ther EU enlarge­ment on the West­ern Balkans. Bilat­eral con­flicts between mem­ber states and asso­ci­ate or can­did­ate mem­ber states might  not only dis­rupt EU enlarge­ment, they may also stall the entire European decision mak­ing pro­cess and affect the Union’s cred­ib­il­ity towards the world as well as to the ever increas­ing num­ber of euro scep­tic citizens.

Given the viol­ent his­tory of the west­ern Balkan region and the rel­at­ive lack of recon­cili­ation, the prob­lems to be expec­ted are ample. Croa­tia may become a full EU mem­ber this year already; Ser­bia is likely to become an offi­cial can­did­ate mem­ber this year and might join the EU as soon as in 2014. Ser­bia and Croa­tia have a num­ber of bor­der dis­putes over some islands in the Danube River. Croa­tia also has bor­der dis­putes with Bos­nia Herzegov­ina, a coun­try that is engaged in Asso­ci­ate Agree­ments with the EU, but which is cur­rently still divided between two com­pletely sep­ar­ated gov­ern­ing entit­ies. Soci­ety here is still largely divided between Bos­niaks, Croats and Serbs and ten­sions between these groups are high. Apart from the bor­der dis­pute with Croa­tia, Ser­bia has an ongo­ing con­flict over Kosovo. Kosovo is recog­nized by Ser­bia as an integ­ral part of its ter­rit­ory, but a self pro­claimed inde­pend­ent coun­try with its own inde­pend­ent ambi­tions to become an EU mem­ber. Ten­sions between Serbs and Albanian Koso­vars are extremely high and occa­sional viol­ence at the Koso­var bor­der is still repor­ted. Fur­ther­more, the Bel­grade Gov­ern­ment con­tends the scope of the EULEX police mis­sion to Kosovo and has a dis­agree­ment with the UN Spe­cial Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s status pro­posal over the mission. 

The Ser­bian Gov­ern­ment has repeatedly stated that its policy towards the status of Kosovo should not be linked in any way to Ser­bian acces­sion to the EU. Ser­bia in this respect feels backed by the inter­na­tional com­munity which is largely divided on the issue, as is the EU itself. As long as Spain, Greece, Slov­akia and Romania refrain to recog­nise Kosovo’s inde­pend­ence, the EU is deemed to be strictly status-neutral on the issue.

If Ser­bia will become EU mem­ber without the Kosovo ques­tion adequately addressed, what will be the pos­i­tion of Kosovo? Will it be in the EU as a rebel­li­ous province of Ser­bia or will it be a polit­ical non-space sim­ilar to North­ern Cyprus? Much of the prob­lems con­cern­ing Ser­bian acces­sion to the EU are cur­rently over­shad­owed by the ques­tion of Serbia’s com­mit­ment to the ICTY (Inter­na­tional Crim­inal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and the arrest of Ratko Mladić. Without doubt the EU’s demand of full cooper­a­tion to the Tribunal is very import­ant in the light of recon­cili­ation and peace build­ing in the region. Nev­er­the­less, the Kosovo issue is of no less import­ance.  The EU should make much clearer that Ser­bian mem­ber­ship will not be real­istic without Belgrade’s recog­ni­tion of Kosovo as an inde­pend­ent state. Com­mit­ment to the ICTY may be an import­ant pre­con­di­tion; it is cer­tainly not the only prob­lem that needs to be solved.

In the future, the Copen­ha­gen cri­teria as an instru­ment for mem­ber­ship eli­gib­il­ity should per­haps be broadened. They should include a bench­mark for good neigh­bour­hood rela­tions and a com­mit­ment to con­struct­ive bilat­eral rela­tions and beha­viour towards other mem­ber states. Learn­ing from the neg­at­ive exper­i­ence in Croatia’s nego­ti­ations, bilat­eral dis­agree­ments should be resolved prior to the onset of offi­cial can­did­ate nego­ti­ations. Like­wise, the com­plic­ated situ­ation of North­ern Cyprus that has become inter­na­tion­ally isol­ated since the acces­sion of the South in 2004 should teach us that dis­agree­ment over the status of a ter­rit­ory is likely to cre­ate prob­lems in inter­na­tional rela­tions. The EU should send out a clear mes­sage that bilat­eral issues should be solved bilat­er­ally and that states should not use the Union as an instru­ment by play­ing EU mem­ber­ship as a trump card.

Related posts:

  1. Viol­ence in North­ern Kosovo: A chal­lenge to Serbia’s EU mem­ber­ship
    Octo­ber 14th, 2011
  2. Serbia’s major obstacle to EU mem­ber­ship: good neigh­bourly rela­tions
    Decem­ber 5th, 2011
  3. The Libyan Con­flict: Mil­it­ary and polit­ical con­sid­er­a­tions
    April 12th, 2011
  4. Roma roam in Rome
    March 1st, 2011
  5. Ser­bia Out
    June 4th, 2011

3 Comments to “Will the former Yugoslav Republics abuse the EU to solve their bilateral conflicts?”

  1. Even­ing,

    First of all, I would like to point out that your work is not that bad when com­pared to the rest of the West­ern crap we had to read over the years.

    How­ever, there are cer­tain things that I noticed, in addi­tion to your very much one-sided approach to this issue. First of all, one small cor­rec­tion, ”Yugoslav Social­ist Repub­lic” never exis­ted. There was SFRJ or Social­ist Fed­eral Repub­lic of Yugoslavia foun­ded in 1947 by Tito and then there was SRJ or Fed­eral Repub­lic of Yugoslavia fouded by Milo­sevic com­pris­ing Ser­bia and Montenegro.

    Second of all, your present­a­tion of the ten­sions between Serbs and Albani­ans por­trays a pic­ture that Serbs are those refus­ing to cooper­ate and that Serbs are the sole prob­lem to find­ing a peace­ful solu­tion.
    I won­der why you did not men­tion the notori­ous organ trade organ­ize by the cur­rent ”polit­ical elite” of the break­away province of Kosovo? Why did you not men­tion that after the Ser­bian troops left and WESTERN powers took over, 300 Serbs were taken to Albania where their organs had been removed and sold abroad.
    Then again, why did you not men­tion that cur­rently there is over 70% unem­ploy­ment rate in Kosovo? Over 150 Medi­eval churches and mon­as­ter­ies have been burned down by the Albani­ans? The sup­port for the inde­pend­ence among the Albani­ans has con­sid­er­ably gone down in the two years that passed…

    These are just a few examples of how Kosovo is a failed state. Since the West is so keen on being mor­ally just, how come they have not recog­nized South Osse­tia and Abkhazia? They were is the sup­posedly same situ­ation as Kosovo.

    Another thing, you wrote ”North­ern Cyprus”, that is wrong, it’s north Cyprus. By writ­ting North Cyprus (with a cap­ital let­ter) you recog­nize the occu­pied area as an inde­pend­ent coun­try. That area was unjustly occu­pied by Tur­key and still today Ank­ara is refus­ing to return the bod­ies of the dead Cyp­ri­ots to the south.
    The area under the Turk­ish occu­pa­tion has not been isol­ated since 2004 when CY entered the Union (like you advoc­ate) but it has been in such a state since 1974.
    The only recog­ni­tion the area ever received (besides Tur­key) is the occa­sional short-lived recog­ni­tion from Azerbaijan. How­ever, they lost that sup­port as well the day Baku took the side of Ser­bia in the issue of Kosovo. Nat­ur­ally, Azerbaijan is bat­tling with its own break­away province of Nagorno-Kharabah where the Armeni­ans are illegaly try­ing to take away the province.

    I am eagerly await­ing for your clarifications.

    Good even­ing from Nicosia

    • Kamiel Mesie says:

      Dear Nemanja,

      First of all, thank you for your com­ment and thank you for point­ing out the cor­rect nomen­clature of the Social¬ist Fed¬eral Repub¬lic of Yugoslavia. I hope that most read­ers still know what I meant. You are abso­lutely right that find­ing a peace­ful solu­tion for the Kosovo con­flict is just as much a respons­ib­il­ity of Koso­var Albani­ans as it is of Serbs. I am aware of the prob­lems in Kosovo that you illus­trate in your com­ment. I have heard about the organ trade, drug trade and the pos­sible involve­ment of Kosovo’s Prime Min­is­ter Hashim Thaci in these crimes. I also know about the fierce dis­crim­in­a­tion that the Serbs in Kosovo are endur­ing and about the destruc­tion of Ser­bian Ortho­dox mon­as­ter­ies (in fact I vis­ited a couple of these mon­as­ter­ies last year that were luck­ily still stand­ing, albeit thanks to strong sur­veil­lance by EU troops).

      The reason I did not spe­cific­ally men­tion all this is the same reason why I did not spe­cific­ally men­tion the gross human rights viol­a­tions com­mit­ted by Ser­bian troops under Milo­sevic; I did not have the space in one blog to men­tion all this. As you may have noticed my blog is about bilat­eral dis­agree­ment of former Yugoslav states being fought out in the EU, and an assess­ment of the risk that this beha­vior will become a trend with fur­ther EU enlarge­ment on the West Balkans. As the offi­cial can­did­ature of Ser­bia seems to be emin­ent, Ser­bia was the most top­ical choice and most atten­tion in my blog was drawn to Ser­bia. It was how­ever not my inten­tion to provide a detailed account of the after­math of the Kosovo war. Neither was it my inten­tion to com­ment on the ques­tion whether Kosovo is a failed state or not. It might, how­ever, be inter­est­ing topic to ded­ic­ate a blog to and maybe some day I will.

      I regret that you call my story ‘one-sided’. I had the impres­sion that I was still rather neut­ral over the ques­tion of respons­ib­il­ity for a peace­ful solu­tion of the Kosovo con­flict, but with such a con­ten­tious issue one seem­ingly can’t be care­ful enough. As for Serbia’s can­did­ate mem­ber­ship, how­ever, I have indeed stated clearly that I believe Ser­bia should recog­nize Kosovo’s inde­pend­ence before join­ing the EU and I still believe this. I abso­lutely share your con­cerns about the cor­rup­tion in Kosovo, the unem­ploy­ment and most of all the mis­treat­ment of eth­nic Serbs, but I can­not see how this should be linked to the repeated refusal of Ser­bia to recog­nize the inde­pend­ence of a ter­rit­ory it has lost its con­trol over at least twelve years ago. Do you ser­i­ously see a future for Kosovo under Ser­bian con­trol again? Your ter­min­o­logy ‘break¬away province’ sug­gests that you do. Fol­low­ing a judge­ment by the Inter­na­tional Court of Justice, as well as the recog­ni­tion of 75 coun­tries today, I would say that is a state of denial.

      Let me be clear that the ques­tion whether Kosovo is a suc­cess­ful state or not is a com­pletely dif­fer­ent ques­tion. Ser­bia and Kosovo have a shared respons­ib­il­ity to resolve the con­flict and I believe that recog­nising Kosovo a first step and part of Serbia’s side of this respons­ib­il­ity. After all, it is Ser­bia that is apply­ing for EU mem­ber­ship at this point and not (yet) Kosovo. As you rightly illus­trated, the prob­lems to over­come in Kosovo are much greater and should be dealt with in due time. Kosovo is a coun­try in trans­ition with a long way to go for pos­sible EU membership.

      As for your com­ments about Cyprus, I do believe that the north has become an isol­ated polit­ical non-space which is for the sake of argu­ment at least com­par­able to an undesir­able scen­ario for Serbia-Kosovo when half of the world would not recog­nise a polit­ical space that is part of (but not con­trolled by!) an EU mem­ber state. You should not attach too much value to my usage of cap­ital let­ters; that does not neces­sar­ily have a polit­ical meaning.

      To con­clude, I won­der what makes you sug­gest that the sup­port for inde­pend­ence has gone down so much. I prob­ably don’t have your fig­ures but my per­sonal exper­i­ence with the people in Kosovo is that most of them are very enthu­si­astic about their inde­pend­ence. True, some of the Koso­vars I talked to would like to see their coun­try integ­rated into Albania. But this is apart from undesir­able also very unreal­istic, as Albania has no interest in such a merger.

      I hope this anwers some of the ques­tions you had.

      All the best and greet­ings from Amsterdam,

      Kam­iel Mesie.

      • Morn­ing,

        Your art­icle was slightly one-sided, that is why I star­ted my reply with con­grat­u­lat­ing you on not writ­ting the typ­ical West­ern propaganda.

        The major­ity of the mon­as­ter­ies in Kosovo have been burned down after the Ser­bian troops left and the secur­ity was taken over by West­ern powers. If I am not mis­taken, the major­ity of the mon­as­ter­ies in Kosovo that were des­troyed were under the pro­tec­tion of the Itali­ans and French. So nat­ur­ally, this has led Serbs to ignore the fact that the West is there as a peace-keeper.

        Now, a pro­pos your com­ment on the breach of human rights that the Serbs com­mit­ted in Kosovo, I will have to add a few things.
        First of all, the major­ity of these so called ”ori­ginal Albani­ans whose fam­il­ies lived in Kosovo from before Christ” moved there in 1947. At that time Tito did not allow Par­tizan Serbs to return to their homes in Kosovo, but rather forced them to settle in other areas mostly in Voj­vod­ina and cer­tain parts of Croa­tia. As a replace­ment he allowd hun­dreds of thou­sands of Albanian who were flee­ing the Maoist regime of Imre Hodja in Albania to settle in Ser­bian homes. Over time the demo­graphic image of Kosovo changed a lot. Albani­ans had up to 10-12 kids where as Serbs and other minor­it­ies 1 or 2. In 1974 when there was enough of them, they launched mass protests which led Tito to change the Yugoslav con­sti­tu­tion in their favor. This is the moment when they have actualy began pav­ing the road for their so-called inde­pend­ence. Nat­ur­ally with the break-up of Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s rulling ‘elite’ felt the need to go inde­pend­ent. Since their chances were equal to zero they launched their guer­illa actions, oth­er­wise known as UCK (ОВК in Ser­bian). In 1998 they have ter­ror­ized Serbs liv­ing in Kosovo, my aunt and her fam­ily being one of them, out of their homes. Sev­eral hun­dred thou­sands Serbs, Roma and other minor­it­ies had to flee.
        In order to pre­vent any fur­ther eth­nic cleans­ing Milo­sevic sent his troops in 1998 to Kosovo. This has led to the illegal NATO bomb­ings in 1999 where around 3.000 inno­cent people lost their lives. Not to men­tion the 300 butchered Serbs whose oragans were removed while being still alive (Dick Marty’s and Karla Del Ponte’s words).
        Now, Kosovo is the craddle of illegal actions, pros­ti­tu­tion, human and drug trade and on top of everything you advoc­ate that Ser­bia should recog­nize Kosovo as an inde­pend­ent state?
        I am sorry if we might live in an illu­sion that Kosovo might be given back to us, but that is where the ori­ginal Ser­bian state was. That is where our first cit­ies rose and where the first Ser­bian king­dom with the Nemanjic dinasty was estab­lished. Today, most of that has been des­troyed by some new­com­mers from the Illyric mountains.

        To get back on the topic, as for your bilat­eral rela­tions and your wor­ry­ing that the rela­tions in the Balkans might affect the cred­ib­il­ity of the EU or slow down the expan­sion, well, all I can tell you is to actu­ally start pay­ing atten­tion to what is hap­pen­ing there. As in the new developp­ments.
        As for Ser­bia, the only prob­lem that we might have is the small part of the Serbia-FYROMian bor­der in the province of Kosovo, how­ever that was reg­u­lated by a treaty in, I believe, 1996.
        Serbian-Croatian rela­tions are on the rise at the moment. It was openly stated by the Croa­tian offi­cials that there will not be any kind of bor­der dis­putes between the two coun­tries. So I guess the EU can breathe calmly once again.
        One thing that the EU should worry about is its pop­ular­ity in the region. Recently I heard the latest stat­ist­ics on ”Should we jon the EU?”, in Ser­bia that num­ber has gone down to 44% (once 68%) whereas in Croa­tia it stands at mea­ger 25%. I guess that we are not so much des­per­ate for the EU as the West thinks.

        My per­sonal opin­ion is that we are not ready for the EU. I do not want to see my coun­try humi­li­ated and ter­ror­ized as was the case of Bul­garia and Romania. We have a very good start­ing pos­i­tion, with very good non-European part­ners. Rus­sia has stood by our side and gran­ted us a free-trade agree­ment which in it’s own turn brought FIAT to Ser­bia. On the other hand, the EU has not been doing any­thing to help us besides give us more loans- which we will have to even­tu­ally repay.
        As for the Albanian being too enthu­si­astic, well of course they have to be. If any­thing, the Balkans has too much pride. They will never tell you to your face what they think or believe. It’s one thing what we say in the Balkans and its a com­pletely other what we feel.

        As for Cyprus and north Cyprus, that is not my own per­sonal view but the one of the Repub­lic of Cyprus. Actu­ally, using the cap­ital n has great polit­ical mean­ing. Over here if you use the cap­ital n it means that you are a sup­porter of the occu­pied zone becom­ing inde­pend­ent. North Cyprus is the offi­cial name of the north­ern self-proclaimed state. Things like these (just like the SFRJ) mat­ter for a lot of people.

        Best regards from sunny Nicosia!

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